In recent years, deep neural network (DNN) approaches prove to be useful in many machine learning tasks, including classification. However, small perturbations that are carefully crafted by attackers can lead to the misclassification of the images. Previous studies have shown that adversarial subspaces lie off (but close to) the data submanifold and detection techniques based on the distributional difference between adversarial and normal samples have been proposed. These distribution-based detection techniques achieve excellent performance in characterizing adversarial samples. In this paper, We propose W-PGD to generate adversarial samples close to normal data distribution to bypass those detecting mechanisms. We trained a neural network WassNet to estimate the difference between two distributions using Wasserstein distance and use the gradient of WassNet to constrain the Wasserstein distance between adversarial and normal samples' distribution. Our experiment shows that W-PGD can effectively decrease the detection rate of distributionbased detection techniques and generate adversarial samples with constrained Wasserstein distance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has been widely used and has achieved state of art performances on image classification. However, recent studies have found that by adding a small perturbation to the normal image, the deep neural network can make classification errors whereas the perturbation is still unrecognizable to human [1] - [3] . This kind of sample is called adversarial sample [1] . Many works have focus on the existence of adversarial samples and certificating the adversarial robustness in various tasks [4] - [7] . Furthermore, the adversarial samples constructed for one model have a considerable probability to succeed in attacking other DNN models [8] , [9] , which makes DNN models having fatal security risks when applied in the real-world environment. For example, image recognition technology is widely used in autonomous vehicle to recognize the situation around the car. If a STOP sign is recognized as another sign, a traffic accident is likely to happen. The existence of adversarial samples is a serious security issue
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Alba Amato . and more attention has to be paid on it. Recent studies also found that the non-robust features of data samples may cause the existence of adversarial samples [10] .
In the context of adversarial samples, attackers aim to craft better adversarial samples to fool DNN models and bypass defense mechanisms. We will review several widely used attacks in the next section. Conversely, defenders aim to craft more robust DNN models or detect adversarial samples before classification. Adversarial Training is proved to be a simple but powerful approach which so far has worked well in practice [11] . And reference [12] proposed a method to augment the output class set with a NULL label and train the classifier to reject the adversarial examples by classifying them as NULL. Detecting mechanisms aim to craft a detector to detect suspicious adversarial samples from normal samples and noisy samples. Reference [13] claimed that the adversarial subspaces lie off (but close to) the normal samples submanifold. And based on the distributional difference between adversarial and normal samples, several defense mechanisms have been proposed. These distributionbased detection techniques achieve excellent performance in characterizing adversarial samples including local intrinsic dimensionality [14] , kernel density [15] , Bayesian uncertainty [15] . And among these detection techniques, local intrinsic dimensionality achieves the state of art performance. Reference [14] found that the local intrinsic dimensionality(LID) of adversarial samples is relatively higher than the one of normal samples since perturbation schemes generally allow the modification of all data coordinates. And LID based detector can detect suspicious adversarial samples effectively.
A majority of works on adversarial attack have focused on the threat models defined by l p norm-bounded perturbations including PGD [11] , FGSM [16] , JSMA [17] , CW [18] . These attacks can effectively generate adversarial samples with small perturbations and lead DNN models to misclassification. However, adversarial samples generated by these attacks lie off (but close to) the normal samples submanifold [13] . And LID based detector can effectively detect these kind of adversarial samples since these attack methods pay no attention to the distributional difference between adversarial and normal samples' distribution.
To bypass distribution-based detection mechanisms, we propose W-PGD to generate adversarial samples lying close to normal data distribution. In our work, we use the distributional difference from the perspective of an attacker. Our main idea is to craft adversarial samples with constrained Wasserstein distance. We propose a new method to craft adversarial samples in an iterative way while limiting the distance between adversarial and normal samples' distribution so as to bypass those detecting mechanisms. In particular, our contributions are the followings:
• We propose an attack method W-PGD as an optimization of the original PGD method. By adding a regularization term to the model loss function, we can craft adversarial samples with a distribution closer to normal samples' distribution using Wasserstein distance as measure metric.
• We train a neural network to estimate the Wasserstein distance between adversarial and normal samples' distribution. The neural network also provides a description of the difference between normal samples' distribution and adversarial samples' distribution.
• We show that adversarial samples generated by W-PGD can decrease the detection rate of distribution based detecting techniques including [14, LID] , [15, KD] , [15, BU] and craft adversarial samples more imperceptible by human. The structure of paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses various adversarial attack methods and detection mechanisms in the literature. Section III explains our proposed W-PGD attack in detail and section IV evaluates our proposed attack method on various images dateset.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Before detailing our approach in the next section, we explain the related works. Firstly, we discuss different attack models employed in the literature. Then, we go over related detecting mechanisms against attacks. Lastly, we discuss the application of Wasserstein distance in the adversarial setting.
A. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
The research of the adversarial attack mainly aim at crafting high quality adversarial samples. A wide range of approaches have been proposed. We will make a brief description of these attacks.
A majority of works on adversarial attack have focused on threat models defined by l p norm-bounded perturbations. l p threat model was original presented by Goodfellow in [16] . Attackers aim to craft perturbations that fool the targeted model with a constraint on l p norm. Below are a brief review of attacks based on the l p norm-bounded threat model.
1) FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD
FGSM [16] is a one-step attack using the sign of the gradient to determine the direction of the perturbation to add. Given an image x and its corresponding true label y, FGSM constructs the perturbations δ with a limitation of :
where J (x, y) is the loss function of the classifier.
2) PROJECTED GRADIENT DESCENT PGD [11] is an iterative version of FGSM and is one of the most widely used method for generating adversarial samples. It tries to find a suitable perturbation direction based on the gradient of the loss function. Given an image x and its corresponding true label y, PGD constructs the perturbations δ with a limitation of in an iterative manner:
In Equation (2), proj constrains x (t+1) into B(x, ):
3) THE CARLINI-WAGNER ATTACK CW [18] is an optimization-based attack model and can craft adversarial samples with relatively small perturbations. The computation cost for generating CW adversarial samples is higher than gradient-base attacks. The perturbations δ is found by solving the problem:
where || · || p is l p norm and f (x) is the objective function of the attacked model.
4) JACOBIAN-BASED SALIENCY MAP APPROACH
JSMA [17] is a targeted attack method with a L 0 limited perturbation. The attack finds an adversarial perturbation using the forward derivative of a DNN. Given an image x, model F, targeted class t. The output for class j is F j (x), the attack tries VOLUME 7, 2019 to maximize F t (x) for misclassification. The predicted class output should be:
Besides the l p threat model for adversarial attacks, attacks focusing on other type of perturbation have also been proposed. Xiao, Chaowei, et al. [19] proposed Spatially Transformed Adversarial Examples generated through spatial transformation. This kind of adversarial example aims to minimize the local geometric distortion rather than the l p pixel error between adversarial and original instance.
Reference [20] proposed Wasserstein Adversarial Example which is bounded in Wasserstein distance from the original example. This kind of adversarial example aims to minimize the cost of moving around pixel mass from original instance to the adversarial one.
Our work aims at the original l p threat model for adversarial attack. Most of the current attack methods are gradientbased or optimization-based. We proposed a regularization term concerning the distributional difference between adversarial and normal samples that can be easily applied to gradient-based attack methods.
B. DETECTING ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
The research on detecting adversarial samples attempts to discriminate adversarial and normal examples considering the features extracted from input data and different layers of a model. Below are a brief review of popular adversarial detection mechanisms.
1) KERNEL DENSITY AND BAYESIAN UNCERTAINTY
Reference [15] investigated model confidence on adversarial samples by looking at Bayesian uncertainty(BU) estimates available in dropout neural networks, and by performing density estimation(KD) in the subspace of deep features learned by the model. Adversarial samples crafted by FGSM, JSMA, BIM can be detected by the detector based on the combination of KD and BU.
2) LOCAL INTRINSIC DIMENSIONALITY
Reference [14] proposed LID for the characterization of adversarial regions of deep networks. LID generalizes the concept of intrinsic dimensionality to the local distance distribution from a point to its neighbors [21] . The LID of a sample x indicates the dimension of the submanifold containing x that would best fit the data distribution in the vicinity of x. Reference [13] claimed that adversarial subspaces lie off (but close to) the data submanifold and Reference [14] found that since attackers exploit the full degrees of freedom afforded by the representational dimension of the data domain and representational dimension is typically far larger than the intrinsic dimension, adversarial samples usually have higher LID scores than normal samples.
3) FEATURE SQUEEZING
Reference [22] proposed to detect adversarial samples by using distortions to squeeze the pixel domain. The method coalesces samples that correspond to many different feature vectors into a single sample and detect whether the input is adversarial or legitimate by comparing a DNN model's prediction on the original input with that on squeezed inputs.
In our experiments, adversarial samples generated by our proposed W-PGD achieves lower detection rate of all these 3 detection mechanisms than adversarial samples generated by FGSM,JSMA and PGD.
C. WASSERSTEIN DISTANCE
In our work, Wasserstein distance is applied as a measure for evaluating the difference between adversarial samples' distribution and normal samples' distribution.
Definition: Wasserstein-1 Distance or Earth-Mover's Distance
where (P r , P g ) denotes the set of all joint distributions γ (x, y) whose marginals are respectively P r and P g . The EM distance can be regarded as the ''cost'' of the optimal transport plan. Reference [20] use Wasserstein distance as an alternative to l p norm to perform PGD-based attack. While we both use Wasserstein distance to perform adversarial attack, the application of Wasserstein distance is quite different. Reference [20] use Wasserstein distance as an alternative of l p norm by calculating the Wasserstein distance between a normal sample and it's corresponding adversarial sample. Wasserstein distance can be regarded as the minimum ''cost'' of turning one pile into the other. In the image classification setting, such distances measure the cost of moving pixel mass. Reference [20] thus proposed a new threat model for adversarial attacks based on the Wasserstein distance. In our work, we calculate the Wasserstein distance between two distributions rather than two images. In this way, we can learn the distributional difference between normal samples' distribution and adversarial samples' distribution. Based on this priori knowledge, we can optimize the existing attack methods.
III. PROPOSED W-PGD METHOD A. MOTIVATION
Characterizing adversarial subspaces using LID is proved to be effective [14] . The detector trained by LID can detect adversarial samples crafted by FGSM, PGD, JSMA, CW with a high accuracy. In our idea, since detecting mechanisms aim to tell the difference between adversarial and normal subspaces, if we can craft adversarial samples lying close to the data distribution, then it is likely to bypass those detecting mechanisms. As an attacker, we need to learn enough knowledge from samples' distributions to find the optimal direction of perturbation. Previous works mainly focus on detecting adversarial samples utilizing data distribution information, and our method uses data distribution information to generate adversarial samples distributionally close to samples' distribution and bypass these detection mechanisms. It is worth mentioning that, calculating Wasserstein distance between two input samples regarding each sample as an independent distribution is not effective for characterizing the difference between two underlying data distributions.
We introduce Wasserstein distance as a metric to measure the difference between two distributions. Wasserstein distance is continuous and differentiable and can provide gradients to guide our perturbations to craft adversarial samples which lie closer to normal samples' distribution. We use a DNN model to estimate the Wasserstein distance. The idea is inspired by W-GAN [23] . W-GAN uses a similar neural network as the discriminator to indicate the difference between the generated samples' distribution and real samples' distribution. While the network architecture of WassNet and the W-GAN discriminator is similar, the purpose and the training is different. In the GAN framework, the discriminator is fed with real data samples and data samples generated by generator. In our work, we train WassNet with normal samples and corresponding adversarial samples so the network can estimate the difference between two distributions. Since the distribution of adversarial samples is assumed to lie off (but close to) normal samples' distribution, the gradient of the network can be utilized by the attacker to craft adversarial samples closer to the normal samples' distribution.
Then we modify the original PGD attack by adding a regularization term into the cost function to guide the search directions of perturbations. We show the proposed attack method W-PGD can decrease the detection rate of LID detectors and craft adversarial samples with a closer Wasserstein distance. It is worth mentioning that the regularization term is not constrained to PGD, and can be applied to other gradientbased attacks with some modifications.
B. ESTIMATING WASSERSTEIN DISTANCE
Wasserstein distance measures the difference between two distributions. It can measure two completely disjoint distributions and provide a stable gradient. The original definition of Wasserstein distance in Equation (6) is incomputable. But we can train a neural network to estimate the Wasserstein distance based on its duality named Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality of EM Distance [24] .
Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality of EM Distance:
In Equation (7), f (x) is an arbitrary function and the Wasserstein distance can be estimated by finding an optimal f (x) that maximize the value of
Thus, we can train a network to fit the optimal f (x) by maximizing E x∼P r [f (x)] − E x∼P θ [f (x)] with a 1-Lipschitz constraint. instead of ReLu to prevent neuronal necrosis and can not be activated when excessive gradients passes. We use Adam optimizer to train the network.
We use PGD attack method to craft adversarial samples because PGD can effectively reflect the gradient characteristics near sample data points. First, we get a batch of training samples and craft corresponding adversarial samples using PGD. Then we feed the neural network with these samples and try to maximize WassNet(B norm )−WassNet(B adv ), where B is a batch of samples. Algorithm (1) shows the complete procedure of training the WassNet. To properly train the network, we use gradient penalty to satisfy the Lipschitz constraint. Notice that there is a 1-Lipschitz constraint in Equation (7) . that means the gradient of f (x) does not change dramatically. WassNet.optimizer.minimize(loss) 7: end for 8: 
Algorithm 1 Training WassNet

return WassNet
We use gradient penalty proposed in WGAN-GP [25] to apply to Lipschitz constraint. First, we generate interpolates between X norm and X adv and calculate gradient penalty using Algorithm 2 Calculate Gradient Penalty Input:
X norm : normal samples batch X adv : adversarial samples batch Output: gradient_penalty
Algorithm (2) shows the detail of calculating gradient penalty. Wasserstein distance is defined as:
And the loss function we try to minimize is as follows:
The training procedure of WassNet tries to maximize WassNet(x) for normal samples while minimizing WassNet(x) for adversarial samples. Our experiments show the WassNet converges well after enough epoches of training on various image datasets. WassNet(x) can be a characteristic to distinguish adversarial samples from normal samples. In the perspective of an attacker, we can use the gradient of WassNet to perform W-PGD attack.
C. CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES VIA PROPOSED W-PGD ATTACK
We try to train a detector based on the characteristic of WassNet. It proves to be effective in distinguishing adversarial samples from normal samples but noisy samples can decrease the performance of WassNet significantly. However, in the perspective of an attacker, WassNet provides the gradient we need to craft adversarial samples closer to normal samples' distribution.
Original PGD attack try to find the direction of perturbation by the gradient of the loss function: ∇ x J (X , y). We proposed a regularization term to add a limitation on the Wasserstein distance between adversarial samples and normal samples distribution. The term can be described as ∇ x WassNet(X ). We want to limit the Wasserstein distance when crafting adversarial samples, so the loss function is described as:
where W (X , Y ) is the Wasserstein distance between two samples. We can estimate the Wasserstein distance as:
WassNet(X norm ) provides no gradients when crafting adversarial samples, so we can modify the loss function as:
where β is a coefficient to balance the gradients of J and WassNet. By increasing β, we can craft adversarial samples closer to normal samples' distribution and get lower detection rate by detecting mechanisms. However, this may decrease the attack success rate. Algorithm (3) describes the detailed procedure. When β is set to 0, the attack method becomes the original PGD attack. The magnitude of the gradient of J and WassNet varies. During the iteration to craft suitable perturbations, if the gradient of WassNet is significantly larger than J , then we fail to find a suitable perturbation to perform attack. Conversely, if it is significantly smaller than J , the W-PGD degenerates into original PGD. So, we add a extra procedure to balance the two gradients during each iteration t:
mean(abs(∇ x J (x t , y))) mean(abs(∇ x WassNet(x t ))) (13) Furthermore, in the experiment, we find that a fixed β can cause obvious decrease in attack success rate. So we try to Algorithm 3 W-PGD Attack Input:
x: the normal sample used to craft adversarial sample I : number of iteration for W-PGD attack WassNet: well trained network to estimate the Wasserstein distance β: coefficient to balance the gradient in each iteration Output:
x adv adversarial sample 1: x 0 = x 2: for each t ∈ I do 3: β t = β · mean(abs(∇ x J (x t ,y))) mean(abs(∇ x WassNet(x t ))) // using β to balance the magnitude of two gradients during each iteration 4:
5:
x (t+1) = clip (x, ) (x t ) // project adversarial samples onto B(x, ) 6: end for 7: return x I use a dynamic β to improve the performance. The algorithm consists simply in decreasing β in a fixed manner every m iterations as showed in algorithm (4) . It can be furthermore fine tuned for better performance.
Algorithm 4 Dynamic β Input:
β: coefficient to balance the gradients I : number of iteration for W-PGD attack m: number of iteration interval to decrease β Output:
β: coefficient to balance the gradient in each iteration 1: for each t ∈ I do 2: if t%m == 0 : then 3: β = β / 10 4: end if 5: end for 6: return β Finally,to find the direction of perturbation, we can use the form below in each iteration generation, Algorithm (3) gives the details of perturbations:
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We provide empirical results showing that the proposed W-PGD attack can craft adversarial samples with a limitation on Wasserstein distance. And W-PGD adversarial samples achieve the lowest detection rate of LID based detectors compared to others adversarial samples. Fig. (1) shows the difference between normal samples and adversarial samples. 
A. SETUP FOR EVALUATION
We mainly use MNIST, CIFAR-10 [26] and SVHN [27] datesets for experiments and visualization. For each dataset, we pretrained a DNN model using training dataset. The MNIST dataset contains 60000 training images and 12000 test images. The pretrained model for MNIST use the same structure as LeNet5 [28] with a training batch size of 100 and 20 epoches. And we use Adam with a learning rate of 1e − 4 as optimizer. It achieves 99.28% classification accuracy on clean images. The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000 32x32 colour images in 10 classes, with 6000 images per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 test images. For CIFAR-10, a 12-layer ConvNet with max-pooling and dropout was used. We use adadelta as optimizer with a batch size of 100 and achieves 85.79% accuracy on clean test images of CIFAR-10. The SVHN dataset contains 73257 digits for training and 26032 digits for testing. A 6-layer ConvNet with max-pooling and dropout is applied to SVHN. We use adadelta as optimizer with a batch size of 100 and achieves 92.30% accuracy on clean test images of SVHN. For all the experiments, images in test set are never used during the procedure of DNN model training and WassNet training to avoid learning the features of test images. And the performance of these model is considered to be sufficient enough for our adversarial study.
WassNet is introduced in Section (III-B) and the network structure is in Table ( 1) and Table (2) . We use normal samples and corresponding adversarial samples crafted by various attack methods as the input of WassNet. We mainly use adversarial samples generated by PGD, FGSM and CW in the experiment. LeakyReLU is applied as the activation function. And we use Adam with a learning rate of 1e − 4 as the optimizer. Training batch size is 100 and epoches = 100. The purpose of WassNet is to estimate the Wasserstein distance of two distributions by using the generalization ability of the neural network. And three CNN layers is enough for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets.
B. EVALUATION ON WassNet
Based on the assumption that adversarial samples do not exist randomly in the feature space, the WassNet is supposed to converge to the Wasserstein distance between normal samples' distribution and adversarial samples' distribution. And our experiment results prove it. Fig. (2) and Fig. (3) shows the loss and the Wasserstein distance estimation during training of WassNet. The relation between two items is:
We samples the values every 100 iterations in the figure. And we can see gradient penalty is stable during the training and the network converges after 100000 iterations.
We can take a deep look into the WassNet. The output of WassNet for normal samples is relatively higher than the one of adversarial samples. And adversarial samples with larger perturbations achieve lower WassNet scores. The distribution of WassNet output is visualized as in Fig. (4) .
Therefore, ∇ x WassNet(X ) can be used to guide the perturbation directions closer to the normal samples' distribution.
Intuitively, we use PGD attack method to craft adversarial samples because PGD can effectively reflect the gradient characteristics near sample data points. To verify the assumption, We first train WassNet with adversarial samples generated by FGSM, PGD and CW separately. Then, a simple logistic regression detector is trained using the WassNet feature to distinguish normal samples from adversarial samples. Table ( 3) shows the result. PGD attack method outperforms FGSM and CW attacks and we use WassNet trained with PGD to perform our W-PGD attack method. 
C. EVALUATION ON PROPOSED W-PGD ATTACK
In this part, we evaluate the adversarial samples crafted by W-PGD. We use WassNet trained with PGD adversarial samples to estimate the Wasserstein distance. Fig. (1) shows the difference between normal samples and adversarial samples. Visually, we can see the W-PGD samples have more elaborate perturbations and lie closer to normal samples' distribution. It modifies less pixel mass than PGD in black areas. Wasserstein distance estimates the distributional difference between adversarial samples and normal samples and Euclidean distance estimates the difference between one adversarial sample from its corresponding normal sample. W-PGD is supposed to craft adversarial samples distributionally close to normal data distribution, so we expect W-PGD to generate adversarial samples with smaller Wasserstein distance while having a mean Euclidean distance consistent with PGD-based adversarial samples.
1) ATTACK TO ACHIEVE 100% SUCCESS RATE
Since our proposed attack method aim to guide the direction of perturbation to move closer to normal samples' distribution, we perform W-PGD and PGD(when β is set to 0) to find adversarial samples that success to fool the model without a limitation on iteration numbers and stop once an appropriate perturbation is found.
We test on 1000 randomly selected samples from test set. Fig. (5) shows the detail. By increasing coefficient β, we can craft adversarial samples with smaller Wasserstein distance whereas the mean Euclidean distance has no increase. That means the perturbation crafted by W-PGD has less impact on the aspect of normal samples. The average iteration numbers needed to perform a success attack for W-PGD is larger than Original PGD attacks. However, the total perturbations remain the same or less, which implies the perturbation crafted by W-PGD is more imperceptible, and by increasing coefficient β, the adversarial samples tend to lie more closer to normal samples' distribution. Fig. (5) also shows that for β larger than 0.8, the performance of W-PGD decreases. The Wasserstein distance and the mean Euclidean distance become larger, which means the distortion of the generated adversarial samples becomes more visible. This is mainly due to the imbalance of the gradient between model's loss function and our WassNet regularization term. When β is large, the gradient of the regularization term β t · ∇ x WassNet(x t ) might become too large for ∇ x J (x t , y) to find the optimal direction to generate adversarial samples. In real world adversarial setting, β should be empirical determined for W-PGD to have a better performance.
2) ATTACK WITH FIXED ITERATIONS β balances the gradient between model's loss function and our WassNet term. Intuitively, a large β can have a significantly influence of the success rate of the attack since ∇ x WassNet(X ) try to constrain the distance between adversarial samples and normal samples' distribution. In this part, we compare the performance of W-PGD and PGD with a fixed iterations setting. The iter number is set to 10 and the iter eps is set to 0.01. Fig. (6) shows the success rate actually decreased which means W-PGD has to sacrifice a certain attack success rate to construct adversarial samples closer to normal samples. And by applying dynamic β strategy, W-PGD can get a balance of the attack strength and the attack success rate.
3) EVALUATION ON DETECTING MECHANISMS
LID is claimed to outperform KD,BU as a characteristic of adversarial subspaces. We calculate the LID scores of adversarial samples crafted by various attacks including W-PGD. Fig. (7) implies the effectiveness of W-PGD to decrease the detection rate of LID based detectors. By increasing β, the detection rate can be further decreased by sacrificing the attack success rate. Fig. (8) shows the result. A detector with a detection rate of less than 50% can be considered as ineffective. And by setting the β to 1.0, our W-PGD adversarial samples can effectively bypass the LID detector.
Additionally, we select several other typical adversarial detection mechanisms to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack including kernel density and Bayesian uncertainty method(KD+BU) proposed in [15] and feature squeezing(FS) proposed in [22] . Table (4) shows the results. W-PGD has lower detection rate for LID, KD+BU and FS detectors. W-PGD tries to craft adversarial samples distributionally close to normal samples, and it shows to be able to decrease the detection rate of detectors based on adversarial subspaces. When β is set to 0.2, W-PGD can achieve lower detection rate than origin PGD and still have a high attack success rate. And by increasing the β, detection rate can be lower at the cost of decreasing attack success rate to some degrees.
V. CONCLUSION
In our work, we proposed W-PGD attack to craft adversarial samples with a limitation on Wasserstein distance between adversarial and normal samples' distribution. Wasserstein distance is regarded as a metric indicating the difference between adversarial and normal samples. To estimate the Wasserstein distance, we train a neural network WassNet.
By adding a regularization term to the original PGD attack, we can craft adversarial samples with closer Wasserstein distance from normal samples' distribution and decrease the detection rate of detectors based on the difference between adversarial subspaces and normal data subspaces. We use Wasserstein distance to constrain the search directions of perturbation not to far from normal samples' distribution.
In addition, by modifying coefficient β, W-PGD is applicable to a wide range of scenarios. If the targeted model is not well defended, the attacker can set a low β to achieve high attack success rate. And by increasing β, the attacker can fool detectors with high probability whereas sacrifice attack success rate in some degree.
The distributional difference between adversarial and normal samples has been effectively applied in defense mechanisms. However, crafting adversarial samples having a similar distribution with clean data still needs more investigation. In our work, we propose W-PGD by adding a regularization term of the loss function to constrain the Wasserstein distance between adversarial and normal samples. Furture research should pay more attention in crafting adversarial samples which lie close to the normal samples' distribution.
